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THE HUMAN RIGHTS COSTS OF CHINA’S ARMS SALES
TO SUDAN—A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON TWO FRONTS
Stephanie L. Kotecki†
Abstract: As an emerging world power, China has a crucial need for oil to meet
its growing fuel consumption. It has invested heavily in Sudan, a country with extensive
and productive oil reserves. However, this partnership has an ugly side. Sudanese militia
groups, as well as government troops, have been committing gross human rights
violations against residents of the Darfur region.
Meanwhile, Chinese arms
manufacturers have continued to export weapons and military equipment to Sudan, with
the full knowledge of the Chinese government. Many of the weapons used to raid
villages in Darfur were manufactured in China.
International norms have evolved to regulate the global arms trade. State usage of
these norms and the general belief in their force both support the argument that these
norms now qualify as customary international law. These potentially enforceable norms
require that arms-trading nations implement and enforce strict export regulations on
licenses for arms shipments, in order to keep those shipments from going to unstable
destinations where there is a high risk that they will be used to perpetuate conflict or
commit human rights abuses. China’s arms trade to Sudan violates this standard and is
arguably a violation of international law. China is also violating international law by
aiding and assisting the government of Sudan in the commission of crimes against
humanity. Sudan is committing human rights abuses against civilians in Darfur, which is
an internationally wrongful act, and China is complicit by indiscriminately providing the
arms that are used in the attacks. China should make the necessary changes to its arms
export practices and regulations to align them with international law, and should
immediately halt further arms shipments to Sudan.

I.

INTRODUCTION
Armed men on horses, camels and vehicles came with
Sudanese government soldiers and surrounded the village at
midday. Two hours later, one . . . plane and two helicopters
flew over the village and shot rockets. The attackers came into
the houses and shot my mother and grandfather. The attack
lasted for two hours and everything was burnt down in the
village. Thirty-five people were killed during the attack—five
women, 17 children and 13 men—and they were not buried.1

†
The author would like to thank Professor Joel Ngugi for his invaluable assistance and the Journal
editorial staff for all their hard work and helpful insights.
1
Amnesty Int’l, Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur, AI Index AFR
54/139/2004, Nov. 16, 2004, at 12, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr541392004
[hereinafter Arming Sudan].
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This story, reported by Darfur resident Adam Roum, whose village was
attacked in June 2003, is just one example of the human rights violations
that have occurred systematically in the Darfur region of Sudan in recent
years.2 Attacks often come from the sky, as Sudanese military helicopters
drop bombs onto villages and farms.3 The aerial bombings frequently occur
before or in conjunction with a ground attack by armed militia in all-terrain
vehicles.4 Members of the state-controlled, heavily armed Janjaweed militia
carry out these ground attacks.5 A study by the World Health Organization
found that almost 27,000 violent deaths occurred in the Darfur region in
2004 (over 2000 per month).6
Since the 1990s, China has been one of the major global suppliers of
military equipment and arms to Sudan.7 Documented reports note the sale of
fifty Chinese-manufactured Z-6 helicopters to the Sudanese government, as
well as the provision of technical repair services by Harbin Dongan Engine,
a Chinese company.8 The small arms exported from China come in the form
of rifles, shotguns, and handguns, according to United Nations (“UN”)
Comtrade data.9 Implicated Chinese weapons manufacturers include
Changhe Aircraft Industries and Dongfeng Aeolus.10
China’s interest in Sudan is not confined to the arms trade. China’s
need for oil has grown rapidly in recent years, and it has invested in African
oil exploration to meet that need.11 Sudan is a primary focus of Chinese oil
development, and China is far ahead of other nations in oil contracts there.12
By 2005, China was buying fifty to sixty percent of Sudan’s oil exports,
2

See The Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 3, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf [hereinafter Report of the ICI on Darfur].
3
Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 10 (citing Oct. 2004 monthly briefing to the U.N. Security Council
by U.N. Special Representative on Sudan Jan Pronk); see also Amnesty Int’l, People’s Republic of China:
Sustaining Conflict and Human Rights Abuses: The Flow of Arms Continues, AI Index ASA 17/030/2006,
June 11, 2006, at 18, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170302006 [hereinafter
Sustaining Conflict] (describing several specific instances of air attack).
4
Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 10.
5
Report of the ICI on Darfur, supra note 2, at 36.
6
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2005: WEAPONS AT
WAR 236-37 box 9.2 (2005) [hereinafter Small Arms Survey 2005].
7
Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 17.
8
Id. (citing NIF and SPLA Carve Up Sudan, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Jan. 7, 1998;
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL, available at www.aviationnow.com/content/
publication/awst/2001outlook/aw347.htm (link provided by Amnesty International requires member login
and password for online access.)).
9
Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 30.
10
Sustaining Conflict, supra note 3, at 18-19.
11
China-Africa Trade Jumps by 39 Percent, BBC NEWS, Dec. 29, 2006, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/
mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4587374.stm.
12
Id.
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fulfilling seven percent of its own consumption needs.13 China has invested
over eight billion dollars in joint exploration contracts in Sudan.14 As
recently as July 2007, a major Chinese oil company reached an agreement
allowing it to search for oil off the coast of Sudan and to own a stake in
production for the next twenty years.15 The state-owned China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (“CNOOC”) is a major presence with 10,000
Chinese workers in the country.16
China’s financial interests in the country may contribute to its tolerant
stance regarding Sudan’s human rights record in Darfur.17 China began
investing in Sudan’s oil fields around the same time that other nations were
breaking off diplomatic ties with the country due to its human rights
abuses.18 China has been a consistent ally to Sudan in the international
debate over the situation in Darfur.19 Human Rights Watch reports that
China provided financial and military support to the Sudanese government
during periods of ethnic cleansing in Darfur.20 China also used its position
on the Security Council to vigorously oppose UN-proposed sanctions against
Khartoum.21
The situation in Darfur highlights the problem of the international
arms trade to conflict regions. Despite global awareness of the humanitarian
crisis in Darfur, China continues to provide military equipment to the
government of Sudan.22 The weapons sent from China to Sudan do not
appear to travel through illicit channels, because China reports these
shipments to the UN Comtrade.23 If the Chinese government gave export
licenses to these shipments, it effectively provided its stamp of approval.
13
Africa: China’s Great Leap Into the Continent, IRINNEWS.ORG, Mar. 23, 2006,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=58530 [hereinafter China’s Great Leap].
14
Id.
15
China to Search for Oil in Sudan, BBC NEWS, July 2, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/6261418.stm.
16
China’s Great Leap, supra note 13, at 2.
17
It is interesting to note that China’s investment in Sudan’s oil resources has provided the
government with a significant cash flow, enabling Sudan to use its new oil wealth to purchase expensive
military equipment from Chinese manufacturers. Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 39-40.
18
See generally China’s Great Leap, supra note 13.
19
Michael Vatikiotis, Oil Lust in the Face of Genocide, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 7, 2004, Vol. 167,
Iss. 40, at 20.
20
China’s Great Leap, supra note 13, at 2.
21
Vatikiotis, supra note 19.
22
China’s shipment of military equipment to Sudan is documented as early as 1996. See Arming
Sudan, supra note 1, at 17. In 2003, China was still Sudan’s major arms supplier, according to UN
Comtrade data. See GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006:
UNFINISHED BUSINESS 77 table 3.2 (2006). See also China, Russia Deny Weapons Breach, BBC NEWS,
May 8, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6632959.stm (reporting claims that photographic evidence
shows that China has continued since 2005 to ship arms to Sudan, which are then sent to Darfur).
23
See Arming Sudan, supra note 1, at 30 n.86.
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Although the human rights abuses taking place in Sudan are well-known in
the international community,24 the instability and conflict within the country
do not appear to prevent Chinese export regulators from approving license
applications for arms shipments to that area. Thus, the “legitimate” trade in
arms between the two countries is serving to prolong and worsen the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur.
Despite the trade benefits of China’s relationship with Sudan, China
cannot afford to continue turning a blind eye to the crisis in Darfur. China’s
arms trade to Sudan violates international law on two levels: 1) As a
primary actor, China fails to adequately regulate arms exports to a conflict
region, and 2) as a secondary actor, it is aiding and assisting the government
of Sudan in the commission of crimes against humanity. China’s actions are
placing the country at risk of international legal sanction. To avoid this
possibility, China should tighten its export license controls so that shipments
of small arms and conventional weapons to Sudan are not authorized
indiscriminately. China’s export regulations are too vague, relying heavily
on the discretion of those who are granting licenses, and must be more
strictly implemented.
Part II of this Comment describes the components that are legally
required for formation and recognition of a norm as customary international
law. Part III argues that the international norm requiring export controls on
arms shipments to conflict areas has attained the status of binding customary
international law. Part IV demonstrates that China is violating this
customary norm by inadequately controlling the export of arms from its
manufacturers to conflict regions. Part V describes how the Articles of State
Responsibility attribute responsibility for internationally wrongful acts to
states that commit or assist in those acts. Part VI proposes that Sudan is
committing internationally wrongful acts in Darfur, that China is providing
assistance to Sudan in the form of arms and equipment, and that both nations
are violating the Draft Articles of State Responsibility. Part VII recommends
legislation and policy changes that would improve China’s adherence to
international law.
II.

INTERNATIONAL NORMS THAT SATISFY THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW HAVE BINDING FORCE

China is not party to any binding treaties that regulate the trade in
small arms and military equipment of the type that is being exported to
24
In 2004, UN member states discussed imposing sanctions on Sudan in response to the human
rights crisis. See Vatikiotis, supra note 19.
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Sudan.25 However, the “hard law” found in treaties and multilateral
agreements26 is not the only source of international legal authority. Custom,
general norms, and less-than-binding agreements, sometimes called “soft
law,” can also have legal force.27 This occurs when the international usage
of the norms is adequately general and widespread to meet the two
requirements of a formal definition of customary international law: usage
and belief that the norm is binding.28
Evidence of customary international law can be found in official
statements and actions,29 UN resolutions,30 and multilateral agreements,31
even those that are not binding on all states.32 A norm that is recognized as
customary international law is binding and can be enforced in court.33
A.

Legal Norms Must Be Supported by States’ General Usage and Opinio
Juris to Qualify as Customary International Law

Customary international law consists of a general practice among
states that has been accepted as law.34 This definition can be divided into
two components: state usage, or patterns and practices of behavior, and
opinio juris, the belief or expectation that the norm is legally binding.35

25
China is signatory to arms control treaties that regulate biological, chemical, and weapons of mass
destruction (“WMD”) shipments, but does not participate in any treaties that cover small arms and
conventional weapons. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, List of Arms Control, Disarmament and NonProliferation Treaties that China has Joined, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/tyylb/t141338.htm
(last visited May 24, 2007).
26
See Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Is International Law Relevant to Arms Control?: Hard Law, Soft
Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 63
(2003).
27
See id.
28
Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 147, 148 (1995/1996).
29
MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 50 (2d ed. 1997).
30
Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 8-9 (1995/1996).
31
Id. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102(3)
(1987).
32
Melissa Robbins, Powerful States, Customary Law and the Erosion of Human Rights Through
Regional Enforcement, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 275, 292-93 (2005).
33
Lillich, supra note 30, at 17-18.
34
Statute of the Int’l Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
35
MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (1999).
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General State Practice of a Norm Satisfies the Usage Requirement

State practice consists of any official statement, action, or omission36
made by a state in its international legal relations.37 This can include
diplomatic correspondence, legislation, or ratification of an international
agreement.38 Concrete actions taken by a state are weighed most heavily as
evidence of state practice,39 but statements also qualify as evidence of
practice.40 These can be verbal statements, such as reports to international
organizations, or written text, such as press releases or policy statements.41
Usage or practice by only one state is not sufficient to meet the
requirements of customary international law.42 Practice among states must
be “uniform, extensive, and representative in character.”43 A long history of
general practice is not required.44 As long as the practice is consistent, it can
develop over a short period of time.45
Although the practice of a norm must be representative, it does not
have to be universal.46 If it includes the states “whose interests are specially
affected,” the norm is presumably representative.47 An example of a
situation where this would apply is a norm affecting states with nuclear
capability.48 Although the norm technically applies to all states, including
those who have not yet developed nuclear capability, the practices of the
states that do have the capability are the most important in showing that a
norm exists.
In addition, all affected states do not have to consent to the norm.
Even dissenting states can be bound by customary law,49 the only exception
being if a state “persistently and openly” dissents from the norm as it
36
INT’L LAW ASS’N COMMITTEE ON THE FORMATION OF RULES OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INT’L
LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW, arts. 4, 6 (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CustomaryLaw.pdf
[hereinafter ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES].
37
Id. commentary to art. 1(b)(1).
38
The Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on its Second Session, 5
June to 29 July 1950, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 12, 368,
370-72, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
39
ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, commentary to art. 3.
40
Id. art. 4.
41
Id. commentary to art. 4.
42
See id. art. 12(i).
43
Id.
44
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (6th ed. 2003).
45
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20).
46
ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, art. 14(i).
47
See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 43.
48
VILLIGER, supra note 29 at 31.
49
Paust, supra note 28, at 152.

JANUARY 2008

CHINA'S ARMS SALES TO SUDAN

215

develops.50 In the same vein, treaties and international agreements can have
the force of customary law, even for countries that are not party to them,
when the principles of the treaty have general application and are widely
accepted.51
2.

A General Belief in the Binding Nature of a Norm Satisfies the Opinio
Juris Requirement

Opinio juris is a legal term for the subjective requirement of legal
belief in a customary international law.52 The Statute of the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) states that customary norms must be practices that
are “accepted as law.”53 A norm is authoritative if states believe that it
creates a legal obligation and that violation of the norm would result in
sanction.54 The belief or legal expectation of one state is not determinative;
rather, the binding nature of the custom comes from the shared norms and
expectations of the international community of states.55
Evidence of a state’s belief in the legality of the custom can be found
in official statements about the binding nature of a rule, or in UN votes and
official statements.56 Evidence of opinio juris can also be inferred from
consistent state action or material practice.57
The International Law Association’s (“ILA”) Statement of Principles
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law
claims, contrary to traditional doctrine, that belief is not necessary for the
formation of the law.58 Thus, the belief prong of customary international law
is arguably the less crucial one, because customary law can form as a result
of consistent state practice even if states do not explicitly express a belief in
the binding nature of the norm.59 However, a showing of legal belief
strengthens the argument that a customary international norm exists because

50

ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, art. 15.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102(3).
52
Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 141 (2005).
53
Statute of the Int’l Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993
54
VILLIGER, supra note 29, at 48.
55
Paust, supra note 28, at 151.
56
VILLIGER, supra note 29 at 51.
57
Guzman, supra note 52, at 149.
58
ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, art. 16.
59
There are exceptions in certain circumstances where the conduct of the state does not by nature
give rise to an expectation of legal authority. This exception includes actions that are outside the realm of a
state’s international legal relations or those that are generally understood to be non-binding in nature. See
id. art. 17.
51
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general belief in a norm’s legal obligation qualifies as proof of customary
law.60
B.

The ICJ’s Definition of Customary International Law Includes New
Sources of Evidence for State Practice and Belief, Such as
International Agreements and Policy Declarations

The ICJ Statute is the authoritative source for the definition of
customary international law, but it does not specifically define the elements
of usage and legal belief.
The precise components of customary
international law are subject to much debate,61 but scholars of international
law seem to agree that the definition of these components is a developing
concept.62 Much of the debate centers on the types of evidence that are
sufficient to show that a law has formed.63 Traditionally, a determination of
customary international law relied primarily on state action as evidence of a
general custom.64 The modern concept of the doctrine is broader, and
includes official declarations, policy statements, resolutions, and treaties as
valid sources of evidence.65
Opinions from the ICJ shed light on this point. In a seminal early ICJ
holding that addressed customary international law, the Court focused
primarily on state actions as proof of a state’s belief in the binding nature of
a custom.66 However, the Court’s analysis in modern cases has been broader
and has not been confined to this narrow interpretation.67 The ICJ’s more
recent examinations of state practice look at state declarations, UN
documents, and treaties.68 This method of inquiry implies that proof of
consistent state action is not always required for a finding of customary law.
More recent decisions follow this line of reasoning and apply a broad
definition of state practice that includes UN documents and participation in
non-binding international conventions, such as the Geneva Conventions69

60

Id. art. 16.
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law:
A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L.. 757, 759-60 (2001).
62
Beth Stephens, Litigating Customary International Human Rights Norms, 25 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 191, 198 (1995/1996).
63
J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 454-55
(2000).
64
Guzman, supra note 52, at 149.
65
Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 817 (2005).
66
See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41-44 (Feb. 20).
67
Meron, supra note 65, at 819.
68
Id. at 820.
69
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113 (June 27).
61
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and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,70 as evidence of
customary law. Thus, ICJ holdings allow for a broad and flexible analysis of
state practice and belief, in which official statements and professed support
of non-binding agreements qualify as evidence of customary international
law.
III.

EVIDENCE EXISTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMS EXPORT CONTROL
NORM THAT MAY QUALIFY AS BINDING CUSTOMARY LAW

The international instruments that set guidelines for arms-trading
countries all specify that strict export license regulations are necessary in
order to maintain global security and to prevent arms from accumulating in
regions where they will have destabilizing or harmful effects.71
Consistently, the central premise of these agreements is that nations that
export arms must implement and enforce regulations that adequately control
the transfer of arms.72
This section synthesizes the major international instruments to
formulate a strong and coherent norm requiring export controls on arms
transfers, and shows that this norm has attained customary international law
status. The international requirement is supported both by state practice and
by the belief of states in its legal force.73 The negotiation, ratification, and
implementation of multilateral agreements by most arms-exporting states are
evidence of state practice. Official statements and UN votes qualify as legal
belief.74 Assuming that this evidence is adequate to prove the existence of
customary law, China is bound by it, even though it has not participated in
its development to the same extent as other nations. China has full
knowledge of the norm, and officially supported it during its development
instead of dissenting.75
A.

Consistent Evidence of the Customary Norm Is Found in Several
Multilateral Agreements and UN Actions

The UN, as well as groups of arms-exporting nations, have instituted
programs and ratified multilateral agreements to establish norms that
regulate international arms shipments. These norms are contained in the
70
71
72
73
74
75

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 21 (Feb. 14).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.4.
See infra Part III.B.
VILLIGER, supra note 29, at 51.
See infra Part III.B.3.
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United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (“UN
PoA”),76 in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (“Wassenaar
Arrangement”),77 and in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (“OSCE
Document”).78 These sources all focus on the need for a cooperative effort
to ensure global stability by regulating export procedures in such a way that
weapons are prevented from falling into the hands of regimes and
individuals who commit human rights violations.79
1.

The UN PoA Provides International Arms Trade Standards for
Member Nations to Implement

The UN PoA is an agreement by member nations to implement
actions on both a national and international level that endeavor to prevent
and eliminate the illicit global trade in small arms and light weapons.80 It
was formulated by a UN Conference in July 2001.81 The General Assembly
officially adopted the PoA at the end of the same year and decided to review
progress made by member states five years later.82
The Preamble of the UN PoA recognizes that “the illicit trade in small
arms . . . sustains conflicts [and] exacerbates violence”83 and that
“[g]overnments bear the primary responsibility for preventing, combating
and eradicating [this trade].”84 The member states resolve to take action to
prevent and combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons
(“SALW”).85 In Section II, the UN PoA presents actions that member states
76
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons
in All
Its
Aspects,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CONF.192/15
(2001),
available at
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html [hereinafter UN PoA].
77
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies, Guidelines & Procedures, Including the Initial Elements (July 12, 1996), available at
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/Guidelines.doc
[hereinafter
Wassenaar
Arrangement
Guidelines].
78
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], OSCE Document on Small Arms
and Light Weapons, OSCE Doc. FSC.JOUR/314 (Nov. 24, 2000), available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2000/11/1873_en.pdf [hereinafter OSCE Document].
79
See infra Part.III.A.4.
80
UN PoA, supra note 76, sec. I, art. 22.
81
See id. sec. I, art. 1 (referencing Conference on the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects meeting in New York, July 9-20, 2001).
82
G.A. Res. 56/24, art. V, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/24 (Dec. 24, 2001).
83
UN PoA, supra note 76, sec. I, art. 5.
84
Id. sec. I, art. 13.
85
Id. sec. I, art. 22(a)-(e).

JANUARY 2008

CHINA'S ARMS SALES TO SUDAN

219

agree to take at the national, regional, and global levels. Of particular
interest to the topic at hand are Sections II(2), (11), and (12), which deal
with regulation of arms production and the need for nations to implement
comprehensive and effective export licensing regulations. Section II(2)
states that at the national level, member nations undertake to implement laws
and administrative regulations that are sufficient to maintain control over the
export of small arms.86 In Section II(11), states are expected to process
export authorizations using strict regulations and procedures that prevent the
illicit trade in weapons, consistent with their “existing responsibilities”
under international law.87 Section II(12) reiterates the importance of state
laws and regulations that control arms exports, and maintains that effective
legal and enforcement measures are important components of this control.88
2.

The Wassenaar Arrangement Is a Multilateral Agreement Between
Many of the Major Arms-Exporting States That Provides Standards
for Export Controls

The Wassenaar Arrangement is an international agreement that is
intended to “complement and reinforce” existing export controls for arms,
and for products and technologies that can be used as arms.89 Forty states
are party to the agreement.90 Most of them are in Europe, but Korea, Japan,
the United States, and South Africa are also signatories.91 The agreement
was ratified in 199692 for the purpose of contributing to international
security by preventing transfers of arms that result in destabilization of a
country or region.93 The procedures require that states use “maximum
restraint as a matter of national policy when considering applications for the
export of arms . . . to all destinations where the risks are judged greatest, in
particular to regions where conflict is occurring.”94

86

Id. sec. II, art.2.
Id. sec. II, art. 11.
Id. sec. II, art. 12.
89
Wassenaar Arrangement Guidelines, supra note 77, sec. I, art. 2.
90
Wassenaar Arrangement, Participating States, http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
91
Id.
92
Wassenaar Arrangement, F.A.Q., http://www.wassenaar.org/faq/index.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2007).
93
Wassenaar Arrangement Guidelines, supra note 77, sec. I, arts. 1-3.
94
Id. sec. IV, art. 2.
87
88
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In 2002, the Wassenaar Arrangement was amended to include an
appendix that deals specifically with the export of SALW.95 The Best
Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (“Best
Practice Guidelines”), which was adopted by a plenary of member states,
retains the themes set forth in the original agreement on conventional
weapons, applying them specifically to SALW.96 The guidelines stipulate
that states will take into account certain factors as they evaluate export
license applications for SALW, including a clear risk that the arms will be
used to prolong an existing armed conflict,97 endanger peace or contribute to
regional instability,98 or “for the violation or suppression of human rights
and fundamental freedoms.”99
3.

The OSCE Document on SALW Is Another Important Multilateral
Agreement That Focuses on Export Controls

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a regional
security organization comprising fifty-six participating states,100 articulates
the norms agreed upon by European arms-exporting states. These states
adopted an agreement on SALW in November of 2000.101 Although only
European and North American states are party to the OSCE, these countries
make up the majority of global arms producers and exporters.102 The OSCE
Document contains many of the same themes as the Wassenaar
Arrangement. These include recognition of the destabilizing effect of arms
transfers to conflict areas103 and the need to develop export control
procedures that account for the situation in destination countries.104
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100
The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, http://www.osce.org (last visited Oct.
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101
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European nations. See Global Issues, The Arms Trade is Big Business, “Arms Sales by Supplier Nations”
chart, http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/BigBusiness.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2007)
[hereinafter Global Issues] (based on data from RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
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The OSCE Document devotes considerable detail to export criteria
and controls.105 The first factor to be considered when reviewing a license
application is the recipient country’s record on human rights and
fundamental freedoms.106 Licenses should be denied to recipients when
there is a clear risk that they will use the arms to violate or suppress human
rights,107 to prolong conflict or endanger peace,108 or to repress civilians.109
The procedures must be sufficient to allow the state “to retain adequate
control over such transfers.”110
4.

These Agreements Are Consistent and Articulate a Specific Norm

The standards set forth in the multilateral agreements described above
can be synthesized into a consistent norm. They contain very similar
objectives, themes, and requirements. Although they are not identical, the
recurring similarities and the overall consistency in these varied agreements
support the argument that a strong, consistent, and specific norm has
emerged.
The central objective of the agreements is to increase global security
and stability by establishing effective state control over the international
transfer of small arms and conventional military equipment.111 All of the
agreements encourage cooperation and the transfer of information between
states, but place the responsibility on individual nations to implement
internal policies and regulations that will stem the flow of arms to unstable
regions or inhumane governments.112
Export controls are a crucial tool addressed in each of the
agreements.113 Specifically, member nations agree to exercise strict control
over the transfer of arms across their borders. License applications must be
reviewed in light of the stability and human rights record of the recipient
country. Licenses should be denied when shipments are destined for areas
where there is a high risk that the arms will be used to perpetuate conflict,

105
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repression, or human rights abuses. Simply enacting these regulations is not
enough, however. They also must be strictly enforced.
Thus, a global norm can be articulated. There is an expectation in the
international community that arms-exporting states will regulate and enforce
export-licensing requirements that restrict arms transfers to conflict areas
and/or to human rights abusers. The implementation of this norm begins on
a national level, but must also be supported by international consistency and
cooperation in order to maintain global security and stability and to protect
human rights.
B.

If State Practice and Belief in the Legality of This Norm Constitute
Customary International Law, It Is Binding on China

The evidence demonstrates that international custom requires strict
export controls on global arms transfers. Participation in the UN PoA by
member states shows both a belief in the objectives of the PoA, and an intent
to implement its directives in practice. Ratification of international
instruments, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, or regional instruments,
such as the OSCE Document, provides evidence of state practice. In
addition, official policy statements and UN votes indicate a general belief
among arms-exporting states that an enforceable norm has been established.
China did not participate fully in the development of the customary norm,
but may still be bound by it because it did not dissent as the potential law
developed.114
1.

Participation in Multilateral Nonproliferation Agreements Is Evidence
That General State Practice of Export Control Norms Exists

The Wassenaar Arrangement fits squarely within the ICJ’s definition
of state practice115 because it is an international instrument that was
negotiated and ratified by a large number of states, including almost all of
the world’s major arms exporters.116 Member states agree to uphold the
goals of the Arrangement by conforming their national export policies to its

114
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directives. 117 The Arrangement stipulates that participating states should
attempt to further its goals through their national policies in order to support
global security.118
The OSCE Document is a regional instrument that mirrors many of
the provisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement.119 Although it cannot be used
as evidence of global norms, it is a good indication of the norms accepted by
European and North American states, regions that include most major arms
exporters. Like the Wassenaar Arrangement, it qualifies as state practice
because of its ratification by signatory states. Taken in their totality, these
two agreements are representative of the customary norm that has emerged
to regulate arms exports.
Although recent in its development, state practice of the export
control norm has been consistent for the past five to ten years. A majority of
states have voiced their belief in a standardized system for control of the
arms trade through export licensing and monitoring. In addition, a number
of arms-exporting states reported to the UN that they have assessed and
improved their arms laws and export regulations.120 The effectiveness of
these policies is illustrated by the fact that most major exporters do not sell
arms to Sudan.121
It should be noted at this point that although the international
instruments that describe the norms for arms exports have not been ratified
by the majority of nations worldwide, they are still indicative of general
global practice. When a norm specially affects only certain states, the
practices of those states are the most important in determining customary
international law.122 The law that develops, however, binds all states.123
Only a handful of nations manufacture and export most of the weapons that
are traded in the international market,124 so it is the practices of these nations
that must be examined most carefully. Nearly all of these countries
participate in the UN PoA, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the OSCE
Document. China is a notable exception, as one of only two top arms117
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exporting countries125 that is not a signatory of the latter two multilateral
agreements. The practices of the majority of arms-exporting states provide
sufficient evidence from which to draw an international norm.
2.

The Actions of the Member States Participating in the UN PoA Show
State Practice and Belief in a Legal Norm for Export Controls

The UN PoA, which urges member states to take responsibility for
controlling the global flow of arms,126 also qualifies as evidence of
customary international law. General Assembly votes and statements by
member countries are often classified as evidence of legal belief in a
norm,127 and ICJ decisions indicate that they can even rise to the level of
state practice.128 The PoA was established by passage of a UN resolution in
2001, with the majority of member states voting in approval.129 This strong
support for the PoA indicates a general belief among nations that states are
to take action to control the arms trade. The member states showed a unified
front on the issue by agreeing to implement the specific provisions of the
Programme in order to prevent the flow of arms to conflict regions.
Although the PoA is a fairly recent development, this does not diminish its
importance as evidence of customary law, since customary norms can
develop in short periods of time as long as they are consistent among
states.130
The UN is collecting status updates on the implementation of the PoA
through periodic conferences where nations report their activities and level
of compliance.131 Many nations have made progress in the first five years of
the PoA. The majority of UN member nations, 137 out of 192 countries,
have submitted reports on their progress.132 Over eighty percent of reporting
nations have addressed their national export and transfer controls in response
to the PoA’s recommendations.133 Actual implementation of PoA directives
goes beyond mere statements, and qualifies as strong evidence of state
practice, as well as a general belief that the custom is legally required.
125
SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2005, supra note 6, at 98. See also supra note 116 (noting that China and
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China’s Policy Statements and Legislative Actions Provide Evidence
of Its Knowledge of and Belief in the International Custom, While
There Is No Indication of Official Dissent

China never officially dissented to the export control norm. In fact,
China explicitly declared its support for the UN PoA. In a statement to the
2006 UN Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, the Chinese Ambassador
to the UN stated that China actively participates in the Programme’s
objectives.134
He claimed that China has established “relatively
comprehensive domestic legislation," and that its export controls “match
international practices, including the licensing system for SALW export.”135
He also promised that “China will continue to actively participate in the PoA
review process in a constructive manner and is ready to exchange experience
and promote cooperation with other parties during the process, in a joint
effort to move forward the multilateral process of combating the illicit trade
in SALW.”136
In addition to statements made to the UN, an internal Chinese policy
directive on arms control affirms that “China is committed to properly
addressing humanitarian issues in the arms control field”137 and explained
that in order to do so, the government will base its policies on the goal of
maintaining national security and global stability.138
These official
statements show a lack of dissent on China’s part, because it has full
knowledge of the international norms and maintains that its policy is to
comply with them. Although statements by an individual nation in support
of a norm do not make it binding, these statements do lead to the inference
that China recognizes the binding nature of the proposed customary law.

134
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CHINA’S EXPORT CONTROL LAWS ALLOW ARMS SHIPMENTS TO SUDAN
AND VIOLATE A POTENTIALLY BINDING CUSTOMARY NORM

China’s export controls do not meet the customary international
standard as set forth in the UN PoA and the Wassenaar and OSCE
agreements. The customary norm that requires strict export controls on arms
shipments to conflict areas may now have the force of international law, for
it is sufficiently supported by evidence of state practice and belief.139
China’s licensing regulations for arms exports are not adequate under this
international standard. Although some of the language in China’s export
regulations contains similarities to the Wassenaar Arrangement language,
there are significant gaps between Chinese practices and international
standards.140 The enacted export regulations are too vague and do not
restrict licenses in the manner required by international law. In addition,
China has failed to adequately implement both its own legal standards and
the more stringent international standards.
A.

China’s Export Laws Give Broad Discretion to License Administrators
and Contain Limited Restrictions Regarding Destination Countries

China’s export regulations are found in the Regulations of the
People’s Republic of China ("PRC") on Administration of Arms Export.141
Article 4 explicitly asserts that the state has control over the management of
arms exports, the power to prevent shipments that would be damaging to
security, and the responsibility to ensure the lawful exercise of export
controls.142 Article 5 contains three principles that determine whether an
arms shipment is appropriate: 1) the arms should be useful to the selfdefense capability of the recipient country, 2) they should not threaten
regional or international peace and stability, and 3) the exports should not
interfere with the internal affairs of the recipient country.143 Article 13
introduces the license system that applies these requirements.144 Proposals
for arms exports must be examined and approved according to the
139
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regulations, and the export of arms is dependent on obtaining a formal
license.145
These principles are vague and internally contradictory. In Article 5,
although subsection (2) requires that licensing authorities consider the
stability of the recipient region, it does not explicitly state that a finding of
instability should result in denial of the application. It is also unclear how
subsection (3), which advocates a policy of non-interference in internal
affairs, might apply when there is internal conflict and instability. Because
the regulations do not give explicit direction for how the general principles
in Article 5 are to be applied when evaluating an export license application,
they give a great deal of discretion to individual license administrators. This
means that the state is not in control of the process, despite the statement to
the contrary in Article 4.
The Chinese regulations do not require denial of a license application
even when there is a risk that the arms will be used to suppress fundamental
freedoms or repress human rights.146 Article 5(2) of the Chinese law
addresses stability and security concerns, but makes no mention of human
rights.147 In fact, Section (3), which advocates a policy of non-interference
in the internal affairs of the destination country,148 leaves little room for
analysis of a recipient government’s human rights record.
B.

China’s Failure to Control Its Arms Exports to Sudan Through
Adequate Controls and Licensing Regulations Is a Possible Violation
of Customary International Law

China is violating international arms control norms by employing
export regulations that are vague and incomplete by international standards.
The prospective customary law described earlier in this Comment requires
that arms-exporting states adequately control the shipments that leave their
borders through strict export regulations.149 Chinese regulations fall short of
this standard because they allow for broad discretion and they lack specific
standards. In addition, international custom requires that an exporting state
prevent arms from being shipped to regions characterized by instability and
human rights violations.150 China’s regulations do not explicitly control for
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human rights violations in destination countries, and thereby fail to meet this
requirement.
China’s recurring approvals of arms shipments to Sudan confirm the
weaknesses of the existing regulations. China is a primary international
supplier of small arms and military equipment to Sudan.151 In Sudan,
government forces are committing crimes against humanity,152 using
weapons obtained from China. The fact that such large-scale arms
shipments have made their way through China’s export licensing system
despite the human rights situation in Darfur indicates that the system does
not meet the international standard.153
THE ILC ARTICLES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY HOLD STATES
RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING OR ASSISTING IN WRONGFUL ACTS

V.

The Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles on State Responsibility”),154 adopted in 2001
by the International Law Commission (“ILC”), define how states can be held
responsible for their international obligations.155 Articles 1-3 address the
general principles of state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts.
Articles 4-11 discuss the attribution of conduct to a state. And Articles 1619 define the responsibility of a state that is complicit with another state in
wrongful actions.
There are two elements to the definition of an internationally wrongful
act. That act must be attributable to the state, and it must constitute “a
breach of an international obligation.”156 The wrongful act can be either an
action or a failure to act when there is a duty to do so.157 Article 3 stipulates
151
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that international law, not internal law, governs the characterization of
internationally wrongful acts.158
Actions of a state are conducted by “organs” of the state.159 This term
covers any individual or entity that carries out governmental functions of the
state, whether legislative, executive, judicial, or regulatory,160 as long as they
are acting within their official capacity.161 If a person or entity is not an
“organ” of the state, but has been empowered to exercise governmental
authority, those actions are also attributable to the state.162
Finally, even the conduct of those without any governmental authority
can be attributed to the state if they are acting under the control or
instruction of the state. In Nicaragua v. United States, the ICJ determined
that the United States did not have “effective control” over the activities of
the Nicaraguan paramilitary forces accused of international crimes.163
Because the United States was not giving them specific orders, it was not
found liable for the wrongful acts they committed, despite its financial
support of their activities.164 However, in a more recent case from the
International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,
the court diverged from the Nicaragua reasoning and used an “overall
control” test to attribute the conduct of paramilitary actors to the state.165
This definition of state control requires that the state finance and equip the
militia, as well as generally coordinate its military aims, but does not require
that direct orders be issued specifically for the wrongful conduct.166
Article 16 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility provides that a
second state can be held responsible for aiding or assisting the first state in
the internationally wrongful act.167 This rule has given rise to the concept
that complicity rather than direct control creates responsibility for an
internationally wrongful act.168 This Article is not invoked often, and there
are no known cases of an international court holding a state responsible
under Article 16 for its complicity in another state’s internationally wrongful
158
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act. The ICJ addressed the issue of transnational state responsibility in its
Nicaragua v. United States decision but did not explicitly provide for
complicity as a violation of state responsibility.169 However, the concept that
complicity is a violation of international law has been applied in
international relations on several occasions.170
Article 16 requires that the state providing assistance know of the
circumstances of the wrongful act and that the act would still be wrongful
under international law if it were committed by the assisting state, rather
than the primary state.171 It is unclear whether the rule requires intent on the
part of the complicit state to assist in wrongdoing, or whether an action that
results in furthering the wrongdoing, with or without intent, is sufficient.172
VI.

CHINA IS VIOLATING THE ARTICLES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BY
PROVIDING AID AND ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN IN THE FORM OF WEAPONS

The internationally wrongful acts committed in Darfur are attributable
to Sudan. It has taken inadequate action to prevent human rights violations
committed by the military as an organ of the state, or non-governmental
forces within its control such as the Janjaweed militias.173 China is
providing aid and assistance to Sudan by allowing the flow of arms from
China to Sudan to continue, with the knowledge that the weapons are likely
going into the hands of those committing the abuses.174 This is a violation of
international law under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
A.

Sudan’s Actions in Darfur Are Internationally Wrongful Acts

Under international law, the actions of the Sudanese military and the
Janjaweed militia in Darfur are wrongful acts. The ILC Articles do not
provide an enumerated list of wrongful actions, but the ICJ specified on
more than one occasion that satisfying the two elements of Article 2

169
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establishes legal responsibility for state action.175 The evidence must show
that the atrocities in Darfur are: 1) attributable to Sudan and 2) a breach of
responsibility under international human rights law. According to the report
prepared by the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur,
Sudanese government forces and Janjaweed militia are responsible for
“serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law
amounting to crimes under international law.”176 Specifically, these crimes
include killing of civilians, destruction of villages, torture, rape, and forced
disappearances,177 acts which all fall into accepted categories of human
rights violations under international law.178
Actions carried out by organs of the state such as government military
forces are attributable to the state.179 After exhaustive research, the UN
Commission of Inquiry concluded that Sudanese military forces have been
committing violent acts against civilians in Darfur.180 Even acts committed
by non-governmental militia groups can be attributed to Sudan, as long as
they were acting under the control or instruction of the government.181 This
situation is analogous to the type of control attributed to the Yugoslavian
government in the Tadic case.182 In that case, the militia groups that
committed crimes against humanity were financed, armed, and organized by
Yugoslavia.183 The conclusions of the UN Commission of Inquiry show that
the Sudanese government exercised this same level of overall control.184
Finally, not only did the Sudanese government provide weapons and
air support for the militia attacks, but it failed to protect innocent civilians
within its borders from ongoing and repetitive attacks.185 Its inadequate
measures in response to the violence in Darfur created a “climate of almost
total impunity for human rights violations.”186 As noted above, states can be
held liable for omissions as well as actions.187
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China’s Provision of Arms to Sudan Qualifies as “Aiding and
Assisting” in an Internationally Wrongful Act

China is complicit in the wrongful acts committed by the Sudanese
forces because it provided aid and assistance in the form of arms shipments,
with full knowledge that the weapons would likely be used to commit
unlawful human rights abuses. As a primary supplier of military equipment
to Sudan,188 China’s arms shipments assist Sudan in its military endeavors
by arming its forces. As described above, the weapons are being used to
commit human rights violations by military organs of the state and militias
which are under the overall control of the state. Chinese weapons are crucial
to the equation, and China can be held responsible for its assistance.
China’s actions fall within the requirements of Article 16 of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility.189 China’s knowledge of the wrongful acts
committed in Darfur can be assumed, since there is ample published
evidence of the crimes. The UN Commission’s report is the most
authoritative record of the situation.190
In addition, human rights
organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have
published comprehensive reports detailing the crimes as reported by local
observers.191 Finally, media coverage and political discussion of the issue
are extensive.192 The criminal nature of Sudan’s actions satisfy the second
prong of Article 16.193 These acts would still be wrongful under
international law if committed by any other state, including China.
VII. CHINA SHOULD AMEND ITS EXPORT REGULATIONS TO CONFORM WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HALT SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO SUDAN
Currently, China could be held responsible for violations of
international law on more than one level. International sanctions are not
automatic, and would depend on a suit being brought before the ICJ or in a
national court under that nation’s laws,194 but China should take measures to
avoid this possibility. Although China has a strong national interest in
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maintaining positive relations with its oil suppliers, especially Sudan, it also
should have a strong interest in protecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms. These are valuable interests in their own right, but also can have
a significant influence on China’s international political standing. China’s
primary policy objective should be to support global security and stability,
and it should not be willing to sacrifice human rights protections in
exchange for fuel contracts.
A.

China Should Revise and Clarify Its Export Regulations in
Accordance with International Customary Norms

First, China needs to make changes to its regulation of exports and its
oversight of export licensing. If arms shipments are more heavily regulated
at the outset of the transfer process, they are much less likely to make their
way to conflict areas such as Sudan, where human rights abuses are rampant.
Rather than giving broad discretion to customs officials to grant licenses, the
state should revise its license regulations according to international law and
ensure that they are strictly enforced. This change would comport with the
principles of the UN PoA, Sections II(2) and II(11), which recommend
increased state oversight of arms exports. The change would also limit the
discretion of officials to give licenses to arms shipments intended for
conflict areas. Increasing the regulation of the export licensing process
could also have the beneficial result of decreasing the number of bribes
offered and accepted.
Second, Article 5 of the Regulations of the PRC on the Administration
of Arms Exports should be amended. The three licensing principles that it
contains, particularly Subsections (1) and (3), do not conform with
international standards.195 Subsection (1), which requires that arms
shipments be useful to a country’s self-defense, seems unnecessary and is
not a primary concern in any of the international instruments that govern
export norms. Subsection (3), which advocates a policy of non-interference,
is potentially contradictory to international custom, which requires that
exporting countries analyze the internal situation in the recipient country.196
Subsection (2), which stipulates the need to support global and regional
security, should remain in place and be supplemented by additional criteria.
The Wassenaar Arrangement is a good source for the principles that should
be included in China’s potential revision of its export controls.197 These
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criteria would decline licenses for arms shipments likely to prolong armed
conflict, endanger stability, or violate human rights and suppress
fundamental freedoms.198
Third, to correct the vagueness and inconsistencies in its current
licensing regulations, China could implement the Wassenaar “Elements for
Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially Destabilising
Accumulations of Conventional Weapons.”199 This document, which is an
amendment to the original agreement establishing the Wassenaar
Arrangement, provides an extensive list of questions to consider when
deciding if a potential recipient of arms poses a high risk for instability or
repression.200 Based on these criteria, the state could maintain an updated
list of countries where conflict and instability produce a high danger that
arms will be used to commit human rights violations. The implementation
of this document would likely provide a human rights component to license
approvals and would address some the vagueness problems in the current
statute.
B.

China Needs to Restrict Further Arms Shipments to Sudan

In addition to examining and revising its current export control
regulations, China needs to immediately restrict the indiscriminate sale of
arms to Sudan. China’s policy of non-interference in countries it trades with
is putting China at risk of being found complicit to the crimes against
humanity committed in Darfur.201 China’s failure to acknowledge the human
rights situation in Sudan is short-sighted. Not only does it put China in a
precarious political position internationally, but it contributes to continued
instability in Sudan. As a major investor in Sudan’s oil wealth, China should
be concerned about the stability of the country and should not contribute to
continued conflict there by providing weapons.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The global arms trade is a vital issue, and the international community
has actively developed norms over the past decade to regulate this trade.
The consistency and binding nature of these norms, as evidenced by general
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state usage and belief, is sufficient to make a case for the existence of a
customary international law regarding arms exports. Specifically, this law
requires that individual states implement and enforce comprehensive and
specific export regulations on arms shipments. These regulations are
intended to protect global security and human freedoms by preventing
shipments to high risk areas.
China’s shipment of arms to Sudan violates this international law.
China’s export regulations are too vague, do not specifically bar shipments
to human rights violators, and are not adequately enforced. In addition,
China is complicit in the humanitarian crimes being committed by Sudanese
forces in Darfur. By supplying arms to a violent regime in an unstable
region, with the full knowledge that the arms will likely be used in crimes
against humanity, China is aiding and assisting Sudan in the commission of
an internationally wrongful act.
Despite the financial value of China’s oil investments in Sudan, China
cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the severe human rights abuses in Darfur.
It should immediately halt further shipments of arms to Sudan, in order to
avoid complicity in the human rights crisis there. China should also
reevaluate its foreign policy in this area, and focus on the long-term goal of
global security and stability, rather than the short-term goal of obtaining
cheap fuel. To this end, China should reform its export control regulations
so that the state adequately manages the arms shipments leaving its borders,
specifically by placing restrictions on licenses given to exports destined for
conflict areas or inhumane regimes.

